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United States v. Olin Corporation:1 How a
Polluter Got Off Clean
MARY FRANCES PALISANO*
[S]ociety should not bear the costs of protecting the public
from hazards produced in the past by a generator, trans-
porter, consumer, or dumpsite owner or operator who has
profited or otherwise benefited from commerce involving
those substances and now wishes to be insulated from any
continuing responsibility for the present hazards to society
that have been created. 2
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I. Introduction
Until May 20, 1996, no court in the United States that
directly addressed the issue of retroactivity had ever rejected
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act's (CERCLA)3 retroactive 4 application. 5 Ad-
ditionally, no court had held that CERCLA's reach was be-
yond Congress' Commerce Clause authority. 6 However, in
United States v. Olin Corp. (Olin), the Southern District of
Alabama ignored fourteen years of precedent and refused to
apply CERCLA retroactively.7 Moreover, the court held
3. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) of 1980 §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
CERCLA was amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). Section 6301 of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat.
1388-314 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)) reauthorizes CERCLA until
Sept. 30, 1994, and grants $5.1 billion of funding.
4. A retroactive law "create[s] new obligations, impose[s] a new duty, or
attach[es] a new disability in respect to the transactions or considerations al-
ready past." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1317 (6th ed. 1990).
5. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1507.
6. See United States v. NL Indus., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 545 (S.D. Ill. 1996).
7. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1507 n.25 (citing United States v. Monsanto
Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. &
Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); HRW Sys. v. Washington Gas, 823 F.
Supp. 318 (D. Md. 1993); City of Phila. v. Stepan Chem., 748 F. Supp. 283 (E.D.
Pa. 1990); Kelley v. Sovent Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439 (W.D. Mich. 1989); O'Neil v.
Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706 (D.R.I. 1988); United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plas-
tics, 680 F. Supp. 546 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Dickerson, 640 F.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/12
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CERCLA to be unconstitutional8 because its application ex-
ceeds Congress' Commerce Clause9 authority in regulating
the disposal' of hazardous substances."
Adopted in 1980,12 CERCLA authorizes the federal gov-
ernment to "provide for liability, compensation, cleanup, and
emergency response for hazardous substances released into
the environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste
Supp. 448 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Ottati & Gross, Inc., 630 F. Supp.
1361 (D.N.H. 1985); Town of Boonton v. Drew Chem., 621 F. Supp. 663 (D.N.J.
1985); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo.
1985); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823
(W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59
(W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo.
1985); Jones v. Inmont, 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984); United States v.
South Carolina Recycling & Disposal Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984);
United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983); State of Ohio ex rel.
Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. Out-
board Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982); United States v. Reilly Tar
& Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982); United States v. Wade, 546
F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (offsite generators of wastes disposed of before
CERCLA's enactment held liable under section 107 of CERCLA); United States
v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984)).
8. See id. at 1533. See Appellant's Brief at 1, United States v. Olin Corp.,
927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (No. 96-6645) thereinafter Brief].
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 §§ 1001-
1102, 1004(3), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k, 6903(3) (1976 & Supp. IV 1994). RCRA
defines the term "disposal" as the
discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing
of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water
so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent
thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or
discharged into any waters, including ground waters.
Id. § 1004(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6903.
11. Section 101(14) of CERCLA defines hazardous substances broadly by
encompassing those substances that are designated as hazardous or toxic under
other environmental statutes, including "hazardous substances" defined under
the Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1972 § 311(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(14) (1994),
"toxic pollutants" under section 307(a) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C § 1317(a), "hazard-
ous air pollutants" listed in the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAA) of 1990
§ 112(6), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (1994), and "hazardous wastes" listed under sec-
tion 1004(5) of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5). See CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(14). Additionally, substances are listed by the EPA in 40 C.F.R. pt.
302.4 (1996).
12. See CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 960-75.
3
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disposal sites." 13 The fundamental goal of CERCLA is to hold
those parties who improperly dispose of hazardous sub-
stances liable for subsequent cleanup costs. 14 Although CER-
CLA was intended to attain this goal, it was passed as a "last
minute compromise,"15 and is often criticized for its statutory
framework and language.' 6
Since its inception, CERCLA has remained controversial
because it does not explicitly mention the term "retroactivity"
in its text.17 This holds true despite the fact that
courts have determined unanimously that CERCLA im-
poses retrospective liability-that is, even where the under-
lying conduct occurred prior to CERCLA's passage.
Additionally, the courts have had little trouble in uphold-
ing the constitutionality of this retrospectivity, finding that
it passes the rationality test established by the Supreme
Court. i8
Over 35,000 sites are known to be contaminated by past dis-
posal actions. 19 Those sites deemed by the United States En-
13. Nevada ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691, 697
(D. Nev. 1996).
14. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir.
1990).
15. See Brief, supra note 8, at 12.
16. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 14 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS
WASTE AND SUBSTANCES at 514-15 (1988).
Vagueness, contradiction, and dissembling are familiar features of
environmental statutes, but CERCLA is secure in its reputation as
the worst drafted of the lot. In CERCLA judicial opinions, denunci-
ations of the text and origin have reached the level of compulsory
ritual, more frequent even than contaminations of the polluted
landscapes that gave rise to the law in the first place.
Id.
17. See, e.g., id.
18. JEFFREY G. MILLER & CRAIG N. JOHNSTON, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE DISPOSAL AND REMEDIATION 58 (1996) [hereinafter MILLER]. Jeffrey G.
Miller is a Professor of Law at Pace University School of Law.
19. See id. at 9. A 1996 report prepared by the Environmental Law Insti-
tute for the United States Environmental Protection Agency identified approxi-
mately 54,000 contaminated sites in the United States, including sites
contaminated after 1980. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
SUPERFUND: STATE VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS PROVIDE ALTERNATIVES TO EN-
COURAGE CLEANUPS, GAO/RCED-97-66 20 (1997) (citing ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/12
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vironmental Protection Agency (EPA)20 to "pose [a] sufficient
danger to health or the environment" are placed on the Na-
tional Priority List (NPL).21 The NPL site cleanups average
over $26 million in remediation costs and six to ten years to
complete. 22
Prior to the Olin decision, if a party improperly disposed
of a hazardous substance on a site before 1980, the year of
CERCLA's enactment, the EPA would first use government
money to clean up the site, and then seek reimbursement
from the responsible party.23 However, under the Olin ra-
tionale, CERCLA only applies prospectively; thus, that party
would not be held liable. 24 As a result, the financial burden of
INSTITUTE, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY
(1995)).
20. The EPA is an administrative agency that is part of the executive
branch. See Miller, supra note 18, at 85. It was created by an executive order
that consolidated environmental responsibility previously held by cabinet level
departments. See id. The EPA is the primary environmental regulator of the
federal government, and is responsible for implementing environmental stat-
utes, including RCRA and CERCLA. See id. at 9.
21. The NPL is a part of CERCLA's response procedures. CERCLA re-
quires the EPA to develop criteria based on risks to public health, welfare, or
the environment. Based on the criteria, EPA ranks the various sites for listing
on the NPL. See CERCLA § 105(a)(8)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(A)-(B)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). SARA was revised in 1990. See Hazard Ranking Sys-
tem, 55 Fed. Reg. 51,532 (1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 App. A (1996)).
The NPL is part of the National Contingency Plan (NCP) and must be updated
annually. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1996). The NCP was last amended in 1994.
See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 59
Fed. Reg. 47, 384 (1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(c)(4) (1996)).
22. See MILLER, supra note 18, at 9.
23. Section 122(a) of CERCLA provides:
The President, in his discretion, may enter into an agreement with
any person (including the owner or operator of the facility from
which a release or substantial threat of release emanates, or any
other potentially responsible person), to perform any response ac-
tion (including any action described in section 9604(b) of this title)
if the President determines that such action will be done properly
by such person. Whenever practicable and in the public interest, as
determined by the President, the President shall act to facilitate
agreements under this section that are in the public interest and
consistent with the National Contingency Plan in order to expedite
effective remedial actions and minimize litigation.
CERCLA § 122(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a).
24. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
5
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a site's cleanup costs would shift to taxpayers and the respon-
sible party would profit from its improper disposal.
With this in mind, the Olin decision had the potential to
adversely affect the future of all Americans and the environ-
ment, including the deterioration of health and welfare, envi-
ronmental degradation, and unwarranted tax increases. This
is evident from the fact that defendants in other jurisdictions
attempted to use the "Olin argument" in their efforts to avoid
paying for their pre-CERCLA polluting a mere six months af-
ter the Olin decision. 25
Congress has legislated that all Americans "should enjoy
a healthy environment and that each person has a responsi-
bility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of
our environment." 26 However, the Olin opinion controverts
this premise by providing a loophole for those parties who un-
lawfully disposed of hazardous substances and benefited from
that disposal at the expense of the American people and the
environment.
This Case Note will examine whether the decision in
Olin had any merit. Part II provides background information
on CERCLA's enactment, including its legislative history and
an overview of case law prior to the Olin decision. Part III
discusses the facts and the procedural history of Olin. Part
IV analyzes the court's reasoning regarding CERCLA's retro-
activity and unconstitutionality by focusing on the language
of the statute and case law. Part V discusses the recent ap-
peal and reversal of the Olin decision. Part VI concludes, as
shown in the appeal, that the Olin court was erroneous in
holding that CERCLA is merely prospective and unconstitu-
tional under the Commerce Clause.
25. See, e.g., Nova Chem., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Tenn.
1996); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., Nos. 87-CV-920, 91-CV-1132,
1996 WL 637559 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. NL Indus., Inc., 936 F. Supp
545 (S.D. Ill. 1996); Gould Inc. v. A & M Battery & Tire Serv., 933 F. Supp. 431
(M.D. Pa. 1996); Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F. Supp.
651 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
26. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 §§ 101-209,101(c),
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d, 4331(c) (1994). See also Alcan Aluminum Corp., 1996
WL 637559.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/12
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II. Background
A. The Evolution and Reauthorization of CERCLA
Stringent federal environmental regulations began with
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 197027 and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.28 How-
ever, Congress soon recognized that "no federal statute regu-
lated the disposal of environmental pollutants, including
solid wastes and hazardous wastes, on land."29 By the mid-
1970s, the amount of discarded hazardous waste30 had accu-
mulated to an exorbitant amount; approximately four billion
tons of waste had been produced yearly.31
In response, Congress enacted a national policy mandat-
ing that "hazardous waste .. be treated,32 stored,33 and dis-
posed 34 of so as to minimize the present and future threat to
27. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401-7671a (1994)).
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1994).
29. United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1070 (D. Colo. 1985).
30. "Hazardous waste" encompasses
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its
quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious charac-
teristics may-(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase
in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating
reversible, illness; or (B) pose a substantial present or potential
hazard to human health or the environment when improperly
treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.
RCRA § 1004(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1976 & Supp. IV 1994).
31. See MILLER, supra note 18, at 44.
32. RCRA states:
[Wihen used in connection with hazardous waste, [treatment]
means any method, technique, or process, including neutralization,
designed to change the physical, chemical, or biological character or
composition of any hazardous waste so as to neutralize such waste
or so as to render such waste nonhazardous, safer for transport,
amenable for recovery, amenable for storage, or reduced in volume.
RCRA § 1004(34), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(34).
33. "[Wlhen used in connection with hazardous waste, [storage] means the
containment of hazardous waste, either on a temporary basis or for a period of
years, in such a manner as not to constitute disposal of such hazardous waste."
Id. § 1004(33), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(33).
34. CERCLA adapted the RCRA definition of disposal.
See R. CRAIG ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK 406 (Thomas
F.P. Sullivan ed., 13th ed. 1996). See also supra note 10.
7
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human health and the environment."35 To implement this
policy, Congress created the Resource Conversation and Re-
covery Act (RCRA), which provides regulations establishing
requirements for "record keeping practices, labeling prac-
tices, use of appropriate containers, use of a manifest sys-
tem,36  and the design, construction, operation and
maintenance of facilities."37 RCRA was "designed as a 'cradle
to grave' regulation that imposed requirements on the gener-
ator, transporter, and owner and operator of the treatment
and disposal facilities for hazardous waste."38
35. In its report on RCRA, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce stated:
The Committee believes that the approach taken by this legislation
eliminates the last remaining loophole in environmental law, that
of unregulated land disposal of discarded materials and hazardous
wastes. Further, the Committee believes that this legislation is
necessary if other environmental laws are to be both cost and envi-
ronmentally effective. At present the federal government is spend-
ing billions of dollars to remove pollutants from the air and water,
only to dispose of such pollutants on the land in an environmentally
unsound manner. The existing methods of land disposal often re-
sult in air pollution, subsurface leachate and surface run-off, which
affect air and water quality. This legislation will eliminate this
problem and permit the environmental laws to function in a coordi-
nated and effective way.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6241-42
(1976).
36. A "manifest system" means "the form used for identifying the quantity,
composition, and the origin, routing, and destination of hazardous waste during
its transportation from the point of generation to the point of disposal, treat-
ment, or storage." RCRA § 1004(12), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(12).
37. United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1070 (D. Colo. 1985).
RCRA provides for the promulgation of regulations by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency applicable to generators of hazardous
waste, transporters of hazardous waste, and owners and operators
of hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities. The
regulations establish requirements respecting, among other things,
record keeping practices, labeling practices, use of appropriate con-
tainers, use of a manifest system, and the design, construction, op-
eration and maintenance of facilities (42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-34; 40
C.F.R. Parts 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267 and 270).
Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1070.
38. ANDERSON, supra note 35, at 44. For the "standards applicable to own-
ers and operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facili-
ties," see RCRA § 3004, 42 U.S.C. § 6924.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/12
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However, Congress soon realized that RCRA was ineffec-
tive in remedying environmental degradation that occurred
from past disposal of hazardous substances. 39 Shortly after
RCRA's enactment, it was discovered that hazardous wastes
disposed of prior to 1976, were not dispersing in safe concen-
trations.40 This problem became more complex when a site
was found to be either inactive or abandoned. 41 For example,
two disposal sites in particular focused the attention of the
American public on the issue of its health and environment:
"Love Canal"42 in Niagara Falls, New York, and "Valley of
the Drums" 43 in Shepardsville, Kentucky. 44 Consequently,
Congress discovered . . . that its work was not complete.
Land pollution presented a problem not encountered with
air and water pollution. Air and navigable waters are,
generally speaking, self-cleansing through time. Carbon
monoxide in air and phosphates in water can thus be
abated by limiting or eliminating present sources of pollu-
tion. But hazardous wastes deposited on land do not sim-
ply disperse into harmless concentrations. They can
percolate through the soil and infiltrate ground water; and
39. See MILLER, supra note 18, at 9.
40. See Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1070.
41. ANDERSON, supra note 35, at 407.
42. See Snyder v. Hooker Chem. & Plastic Corp., 429 N.Y.S.2d 153 (Sup. Ct.
1980). "In September, 1979, plaintiffs commenced th[is] ... action in the form
of a class action, alleging that they became 'sick, sore, lame, and disabled' due
to exposure to hazardous waste while residents of the 'Love Canal Site.'" Id. at
154. See also S. REP. No. 96-848, pt. I, at 8-10 (1980), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 2, at Vol. II, 480-81. This site received national attention,
including then President Jimmy Carter declaring the Love Canal Site a disas-
ter area, as well as national coverage by the press. See, e.g., Kathy Trost, Love
Canal: I've Had More Sleepless Nights Than I Can Count: Despite Warning
Signs, Some Residents Stay On, WASH. POST, June 23, 1980, at Al; Robert D.
McFadden, Love Canal: A Look Back, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 30, 1984, at B6; Chemi-
cal Firm Held Liable for Cleanup of Love Canal, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1988, at 2.
43. See S. REP. No. 96-848, at 4 (1980), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 2, at Vol. II, 478. Like Love Canal, discussed supra note 43, Valley
of the Drums also received national press coverage. See, e.g., Bill Richards,
U.S. to Sue Hazardous Waste Dumping, Companies Face Action 100 Sites,
WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1979, at A2; David F. Salisbury, Superfund Set to Start
Cleaning Up Abandoned Hazardous Waste Sites, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Dec.
8, 1980, at 7.
44. See MILLER, supra note 18, at 52.
40919971
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they can persist over long periods of time. Congress, faced
with sites such as Love Canal, clearly understood that the
mere regulation of current land disposal would not ade-
quately protect the public health and welfare or the
environment.45
CERCLA, enacted in 1980, "was designed to respond to
situations involving the past disposal of hazardous sub-
stances."46 Accordingly, Congress established Superfund, 47
which comprised $1.6 billion in order to facilitate the EPA's
remediation of hazardous substances." Moreover, CERCLA
required the EPA to create a National Contingency Plan
(NCP)49 to be read in conjunction with CERCLA section
104(a)(1), which establishes the framework for remedial ac-
tion and expenditure of Superfund money. 50
CERCLA "compliments [RCRA] which regulates an ongo-
ing hazardous waste handling and disposal."51 The goal of
CERCLA is to "cleanup leaking, inactive or abandoned sites
and provide emergency response to spills." 52 In short,
CERCLA is not a traditional 'command and control' regula-
tory program; its focus is not on establishing rules gov-
erning future behavior. CERCLA authorizes remediation
of contamination and imposes liability for past actions as-
sociated with it, even if those actions were consistent with
all then-existing laws and standards of care. That liability
can be enormous. 53
45. Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1070-71.
46. ANDERSON, supra note 35, at 225.
47. One of the most important aspects of CERCLA, used by EPA to clean up
hazardous waste sites, is Superfmnd. Superfind is made up of taxes imposed on
industrial companies, industry, and general tax revenue. See id. at 226.
48. See MILLER, supra note 18, at 56.
49. The NCP creates a framework for analyzing the procedural and sub-
stantive elements of the CERCLA cleanup process. See id. at 56-57. The NCP
authorizes the expenditure of Superfund money at sites on the NPL; however,
CERCLA activities can occur at sites not on the NPL. See id. at 57.
50. See id. at 56. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1996) (the EPA's guidance for CER-
CIA § 104(a)(1), 44 U.S.C § 9604(a)(1)).
51. ANDERSON, supra note 35, at 225.
52. JOHN C. CRUDEN, ALI-ABA CONTINUING EDUCATION, ENVIRONMENTAL
LITIGATION 519 (1996).
53. MILLER, supra note 18, at 52.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/12
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At the time of CERCLA's enactment, Congress was not
aware of the powerful mechanism it had created. 54 In fact,
CERCLA's liability scheme has an impact on "virtually every
industrial real estate transaction" in the Nation.55 For liabil-
ity to attach, the EPA merely has to show a release 56 or a
threatened release of a hazardous substance from the site,
caused by a potentially responsible party (PRP).5 7 Moreover,
a PRP is defined broadly by the EPA58 and will be held
strictly liable59 for problems caused by its disposal activi-
ties.60 Under CERCLA, those owners, generators, and trans-
porters found responsible are liable for
54. See id. at 55.
55. See id.
56. The term "release" includes:
any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, dis-
charging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into
the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of bar-
rels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any haz-
ardous substance or pollutant or contaminant) ....
CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988 & Supp. V 1996).
57. A "PRP" is defined as
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous
substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise ar-
ranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned
or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any
facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or
entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous sub-
stances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incinera-
tion vessels or sites selected by such person ....
CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
58. See MILLER, supra note 18, at 57.
59. Under CERCLA, there is little reference to the scope of the term "liabil-
ity"; however, the legislative history clarifies Congress's intention to hold the
statute strictly liable without regard to fault or culpability. See S. REP. No. 96-
848 (1980), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at Vol. II, 492-93.
CERCLA provides for broad liability, including strict, joint, and several and
retroactive liability. CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). See, e.g., United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (D. Ohio 1983) (discussing the
scope of CERCLA liability).
60. See Brief, supra note 8, at 3. The only defenses against liability in CER-
CLA are narrowly drawn and include: acts of God, acts of war, and acts or
11
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(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe
not inconsistent with the national contingency plan; (B)
any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency
plan; (C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assess-
ing such injury, destruction or loss resulting from such a
release; and (D) the costs of any health effects study car-
ried out under section 9604(I) of this title. 61
Although CERCLA was more powerful than anticipated,
Congress reauthorized and amended CERCLA through the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) in
1986.62 SARA "reflect[s] [an] overwhelming [c]ongressional
satisfaction with CERCLA's original scope and liability
scheme, as interpreted by the courts in the intervening
years."63 SARA did not change the original structure of CER-
CLA, but introduced new concepts that acknowledged con-
gressional dissatisfaction with the "EPA's administration of
CERCLA, particularly [its] slow pace of remediation."64 In
short, SARA provided the EPA with guidance in exercising its
authority.65 For example, Congress developed "a schedule to
assess, study and remediate contaminated sites."66 Congress
also increased Superfund to $8.5 billion dollars and, in 1990,
added another $5.1 billion, providing the EPA with more
money to expedite Superfund cleanups.67
omissions of a third party not in contractual privity with the party asserting the
defense. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607. SARA created a third party de-
fense called the "innocent purchaser" defense. See id. § 101(35), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(35).
61. See id. § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
62. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1615 (1986). The statute in total is still
referred to as CERCLA, despite the 1986 SARA amendments. See ANDERSON,
supra note 35, at 472.
63. MILLER, supra note 18, at 55.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 55-56.
66. Id. at 56.
67. See id.
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B. Case Law
1. Retroactivity
Prior to the Olin decision, courts throughout the United
States consistently held that CERCLA applied retroac-
tively.68 This occurred even though CERCLA's statutory lan-
guage does not explicitly mention the term retroactivity.69
a. State of Ohio ex rel Brown v. Georgeoff
(Georgeoff)70
In 1983, the Georgeoff court held that the congressional
intent of CERCLA was sufficient evidence to compel a retro-
active application of CERCLA. 71 In analyzing CERCLA, the
court applied the Supreme Court's ruling in Greene v. United
States,72 which stated that
the first rule of construction is that legislation must be con-
sidered as addressed to the future, not to the past... [and]
a retroactive operation will not be given to a statute which
interferes with antecedent rights . . . unless such be 'the
unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and mani-
fest intention of the legislature.' 73
Using a presumption against retroactivity, the Georgeoff
court examined the statutory language, noting that CER-
CLA's statutory language does not explicitly indicate an in-
tent to apply CERCLA retroactively. 74
The state presented a twofold argument to persuade the
court that Congress did, in fact, intend a retroactive effect. 75
The state's chief argument 76 was made pursuant to section
68. See supra note 7. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed this
subject. Search of WESTLAW, SCT Library (Nov. 1, 1996).
69. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
70. 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
71. Id. at 1314.
72. See id. at 1308.
73. Id. at 1306 (quoting Union Pacific R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co.,
231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913)).
74. See id. at 1308.
75. See id. at 1311-12.
76. There are three arguments not addressed by the court that support the
theory that CERCLA is retroactive. First, CERCLA commonly refers to "inac-
1997] 413
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107(a), particularly subsection (4), which provides provisions
for civil liability. 77 The state demonstrated its argument by
using the date of the enactment of CERCLA, 1980, as a point
of reference. 78 The state focused its argument on subsection
(a)(4), which extends liability to "any person who accepts or
accepted any hazardous substances for transport,"79 arguing
that the past tense verb "accepted" indicates liability for con-
duct following CERCLA's enactment.8 0 However, the court
was not convinced that the terms in the statutory provisions
provided the "imperative character" required to defeat a pre-
sumption against retroactivity.8 '
The court stated that prior to CERCLA's enactment, sub-
section (a)(4) read "any person who accepts any hazardous
substances for transport."8 2 When the change "or accepted"
was eventually incorporated in the text, the court found that
because it was not mentioned in the legislative history, Con-
tive" waste disposal sites, indicating Congress's intent to center on past, rather
than future, acts. See id. at 1310. Additionally, CERCLA permits reimburse-
ments from the Superfund for response costs for conduct pre-CERCLA, imply-
ing that some provisions of CERCLA are retroactive. See id. Lastly, section
9607(f) regarding recovery for injuries to natural resources occurring pre-CER-
CLA implies that a comparable prohibition does not apply to other response
costs. See id. The court noted that this provision "only serves to support Ohio's
attempt to override the presumption." See id. See also CERLCA § 101, 42
U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) ("in the case of any abandoned
facility . . . "); H. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 22 (1980), re-
printed in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119, 6125 ("It is the intent of the Committee
... [to] establish a comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate
and control the vast problems associated with abandoned and inactive hazard-
ous waste disposal sites").
"BFI, in response, argues that these provisions only authorize state action
to clean up existing dump sites. They do not authorize suits against individuals
responsible for creating the hazard, nor does such a reading necessarily have to
follow from CERCLA." Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1310 n.14. The court ex-
plained that it only consider these statutory terms as indicia of a congressional
intent to apply CERCLA retroactively. See id. at 1311-12.
77. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
78. See Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1310.
79. Id. at 1309-10.
80. See id. at 1310.
81. See id. at 1311. However, the court did conclude that the provisions
argued provided some evidence of congressional intent. See id. at 1311-12.
82. Id. at 1310 n.10 (citing S. REP. No. 96-848 (1980)).
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/12
1997] U.S. v. OLIN CORP. 415
gress did not intend to attach significance to the addition.8 3
The court determined that under the state's theory, a past
tense verb would suggest application to pre-enactment acts,
whereas a present or future tense verb would only apply to
post-enactment acts.8 4 The court demonstrated that if this
were true, "this provision would only apply to generators who
arranged for disposal before the enactment of CERCLA, and
not those who arrange for disposal after the enactment of
CERCLA.'85 Accordingly, the court held that this "construc-
tion produces the anomalous result of providing for a retroac-
tive, but not a prospective, application of the statute, a result
which Congress could not have intended."8 6
83. See id. (citing 126 CONG. REC. S14, 719 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1980)).
At oral argument, Ohio and Justice also argued that the words 'se-
lected by such person' in § 9607(a)(4) also indicate a congressional
intent to apply CERCLA retroactively. Upon review, this Court
finds that argument unpersuasive. The word 'selected' applies
equally to future, as well as past, applications of the statute. In
fact, no other form of the verb 'select' would make sense in this
position.
Id. at 1310 n.11.
84. See id. at 1310.
85. Id.
86. Id. The court suggested that a more logical interpretation of the lan-
guage is
to read the phrase 'accepts or accepted' from the perspective of the
time of a release or threatened release, a view supported by the
language of § 9607. Under § 9607, two events must take place
before any liability accrues. The individual must fall within one of
the categories specified by subsections 1-4 of § 9607(a) and a release
or threatened release must occur. It therefore makes sense to in-
terpret the former event, the act by the individual, in the context of
the latter event, the release or threatened release. Construing the
phrase 'accepts or accepted' from the time of a release, the word
accepted will apply to all impositions of liability under CERCLA;
the act of accepting the hazardous wastes will have always taken
place before the occurrence of a release which causes the incurrence
of response costs. Transporters who acted after the enactment of
CERCLA will be held liable as having 'accepted' hazardous wastes.
It will be unnecessary to construe the word 'accepted' to apply to
pre-enactment conduct to give it effect. 'Accepted' may apply to pre-
enactment conduct, but the statute does not require such an
application.
Id. at 1310 n.12.
This construction of § 9607(a)(4) makes the word 'accepts' virtually
meaningless. At most, 'accepts' will apply to transporters who ac-
15
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Next, the state argued that the congressional debates
demonstrated an unequivocal intent by Congress to make the
industry pay for the cleanup costs.8 7 In response, the defend-
ant, Georgeoff, argued that Congress only intended industry
to pay for cleanups through the special tax industry is re-
quired to pay to finance the Superfund. 8 In its analysis, the
court noted that when CERCLA was enacted, the total
amount in the Superfund was merely $1.6 billion.8 9 At that
time, the average cost of a cleanup exceeded $3 million per
site.90 Accordingly, the court held that this amount obviously
was not intended to clean up the thousands of hazardous
sites without any responsible parties supplementing a major-
ity of the cleanup costs911 The court reasoned that the insuffi-
cient funds in the Superfund indicated that "Congress did not
intend for the fund to be depleted, rather that the fund would
be maintained as a revolving fund for advancing the costs of
these clean up operations while litigation progressed."92
Thus, the court concluded that the legislative history demon-
strated a clear congressional intent to have industry pay for
cleanups, including retroactive liability. 93
b. United States v. Shell Oil Co. (Shell Oil)94
Two years later, the Shell Oil court determined that
CERCLA did, in fact, authorize the recovery of government
pre-enactment response costs from the industry.95 To deter-
mine if Congress overrode the presumption against retroac-
cept hazardous substances for transport to facilities from which a
release is presently occurring.
Id.
87. See id. at 1311.
88. See id. at 1312.
89. See id. at 1312-13.
90. See id. at 1313. When CERCLA was enacted, the highest cost esti-
mated for cleanup of all known contaminated sites was approximately $44 bil-
lion. See 126 CONG. REC. H9177 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (remarks of Rep.
Railsback).
91. See Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1312.
92. Id. at 1313.
93. See id.
94. 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985).
95. Id. at 1079.
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tivity, the court first examined the statutory language in
CERCLA's liability section.96 Ultimately, the court deter-
mined that there was no explicit statement of congressional
intent.97 As previous courts have found, this court failed to
ascertain Congress' intent regarding retroactivity from the
verb tenses in section 107(a). 98
The court next focused on other statutory provisions of
CERCLA and its legislative history, assessing the general
purpose and overall scheme of CERCLA.99 In its analysis,
the court examined CERCLA in an historical context, specifi-
cally in light of its place among prior environmental stat-
utes. 100 Since no pre-CERCLA law addressed environmental
problems resulting from hazardous waste disposed of in the
past, the court found that CERCLA was enacted by Congress
to solve the deficiencies that left regulatory gaps with inac-
tive hazardous waste disposal sites. 1'0
96. See id. at 1069. CERCLA's liability provision, section 107(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a), is discussed supra Part II.A.
97. See Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1069.
98. See Georgeoff, 502 F. Supp. at 1309-10. In Georgeoff the court analyzed
the verb tenses in section 107(a) to determine whether Congress intended re-
sponsible parties to be liable for their acts pre-CERCLA. See id. The court
noted that the "awkwardness of this phrase may be explained by the context of
CERCLA's passage. CERCLA was rushed through a lame duck session of Con-
gress, and therefore, might not have received adequate drafting." Id. at 1310
n.12.
99. See Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1069-70.
100. See id. at 1070. Congress, in 1976, enacted RCRA, Pub. L. No. 94-580,
90 Stat. 2795 (1976), subsequently codified as an amendment to the Solid Waste
Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1976 & Supp. IV 1994). See Shell Oil,
605 F. Supp. at 1070.
101. See Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1070. The background and need for CER-
CLA are explained in House Report 1016 as follows:
Over the past two decades, the Congress has enacted strong envi-
ronmental legislation in recognition of the danger to human health
and the environment posed by a host of environmental pollutants.
This field of environmental legislation has expanded to address
newly discovered sources of such danger as the frontiers of medical
and scientific knowledge have been broadened. After having previ-
ously focused on air and water pollutants, the Congress, in the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, provided a
prospective cradle-to-grave regulatory regime governing the move-
ment of hazardous waste in our society. Since enactment of that
law, a major new source of environmental concern has surfaced:
17
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Thereafter, the two issues the Shell Oil court addressed
were: (1) whether, under CERCLA, responsible parties are
liable for acts committed prior to CERCLA's enactment; and
(2) whether responsible parties should pay for government
costs in addressing the pre-enactment conduct.10 2 Agreeing
with prior courts' analyses, this court dismissed the first is-
sue as settled law. 10 3
the tragic consequences of improperly, negligently, and recklessly
[sic] hazardous waste disposal practices known as the 'inactive haz-
ardous waste site problem.' The unfortunate human health and en-
vironmental consequence of these practices has received national
attention amidst growing public and congressional concern over the
magnitude of the problem and the appropriate course of response
that should be pursued. Existing law is clearly inadequate to deal
with this massive problem.
Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1071 (citing H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, 17-18, 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120 (1980)).
The Report went on to detail the inadequacies of existing law. Of
particular significance to this discussion is the following
observation:
'(c) Deficiencies in RCRA have left important regulatory gaps.
(1) The Act is prospective and applies to past sites only to the
extent that they are posing an imminent hazard. Even there[,] the
Act is of no help if a financially responsible owner of the site cannot
be located.'
Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, at 22, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6125).
After recounting a number of environmental disasters, including
Love Canal, the [Senate] report concluded
'There is limited authority to solve these problems. Regula-
tions promulgated in May under subtitle C of the Solid Waste Dis-
posal Act [RCRA], which impose tough new standards for operating
toxic waste disposal facilities, are expected to greatly upgrade the
Nation's active toxic waste disposal sites. But the regulations do
not address those situations where an owner is unknown or is un-
able to pay the cleanup costs, nor do they address the cleanup of
spills, illegal dumping, or releases generally.'
Id. (citing S. REP. No. 96-848, 10-11 (1980)).
102. Id.
103. See id. at 1072 (citing United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Dis-
posal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984); United States v. Conservation
Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Northeastern
Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. A & F
Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Price, 577 F.
Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983); Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983);
United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ill. 1982);
United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982);
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As to the second issue, the court concluded that there
was congressional intent to hold responsible parties liable for
acts prior to CERCLA's enactment because Congress for-
merly imposed cleanup costs on industry,10 4 rather than tax-
payers.10 5 The court commented on several controversial
aspects of CERCLA's legislative history, 10 6 including a last
minute amendment by the Senate to remove the provision
imposing liability for personal injury caused by hazardous
waste disposal. The Senate amendment was struck down by
the House. As a result, House Bill 7020 (H.R. 7020) was
crafted.10 7 Section 3072 of H.R. 7020, as introduced, pro-
vided: "The provisions of this subpart and subpart C shall
apply to releases of hazardous waste without regard to
whether or not such releases occurred before or occur on or
after, the date of the enactment of the Hazardous Waste Con-
tainment Act of 1980."108 The government argued "that H.R.
7020, as introduced, authorized the recovery of pre-enact-
ment response costs." 0 9 Since this retroactivity provision
was struck from H.R. 7020,110 Shell Oil argued that its dele-
tion weighs heavily against a retroactive application of
CERCLA. 111
However, the court refused to agree with Shell Oil's ar-
gument because the language did not become law." 2 The
version enacted by Congress substituted the House language
with that of Senate Bill 1480 (S. 1480).113 Therefore, it is un-
United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (offsite generators of
wastes disposed of before CERCLA's enactment liable under section 107)).
104. For purposes of this discussion, "industry" encompasses any entity that
is involved in the production, storage, treatment and disposal of hazardous
substances.
105. See Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1073.
106. See id. at 1077. The two significant bills which passed through the
House and Senate were Senate Bill 1480, S. 1480, 96th Cong. (1980), and House
Bill 7020, H.R.7020, 96th Cong. (1980). See id.
107. House Bill 7020 exhibited the House file number because of a require-
ment that appropriations measures originate in the House. See id. at 1076.
108. H.R. 7020 § 3072.
109. Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1077.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. See 126 CONG. REC. 31,950 (1980).
1997] 419
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clear whether the House's liability scheme was incorporated
in the final version of the bill or whether the House accepted
the Senate's liability language. 114
This provision, cited by Shell Oil, only addressed the
time when the releases occurred. 115 It did not distinguish be-
tween costs incurred pre-enactment and post-enactment. 1 6
Yet, Shell Oil argued that S. 1480 subsection 4(n) was struck
from the enacted compromise bill to indicate an intent not to
authorize recovery for pre-enactment response costs."17
114. See Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1077.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 1077 n.5.
CERCLA's liability provisions originated from the original Senate
Bill, S.1480. S.1480, which contained a liability provision for costs
of removal (§ 4(a)(1)) and for natural resources, property and per-
sonal injury damages (§ 4(a)(2)). During discussions of S.1480 in
the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, the issue
retroactive appiication of the bill was addressed.
Transcript of Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works Mark-up
Session of S. 1480, June 26-27, 1980.
117. See Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1076. Senate Bill 1480's liability provi-
sion, as introduced, read as follows:
IT] he owner or operator of a vessel or an onshore or offshore facility
from which a hazardous substance is discharged, released, or dis-
posed of in violation of section 3(a) of this Act ... shall be jointly,
severally, and strictly liable for-(1)(A) all costs of removal, con-
tainment, or emergency response incurred by the United States
Government or a State and (B) any other costs or expenses incurred
by any person to remove a hazardous substance as the terms 're-
move' or 'removal' are defined in section 311(a)(8) of the Clean
Water Act; and (2) all damages for economic loss or loss due to per-
sonal injury or loss of natural resources resulting from such a dis-
charge, release, or disposal, including-(A) any injury to,
destruction of, or loss of any real or personal property, including
relocation costs; (B) any loss of use of real or personal property; (C)
any injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss;
(D) any loss of use of any natural resources, without regard to the
ownership or management of such resources; (E) any loss of income
or profits or impairment of earning capacity resulting from injury to
or destruction of real or personal property or natural resources,
without regard to the ownership of such property or resources; (F)
all out-of-pocket medical expenses, including rehabilitation costs,
due to personal injury; and (G) any direct or indirect loss of tax,
royalty, rental, or net profits share revenue by the Federal Govern-
ment or any State or political subdivision thereof, for a period of not
to exceed one year.
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However, the time limitations on damages supplemented
by S. 1480 section 4(n) were sustained in the final version of
CERCLA as the limitations on recovery of natural resource
damages. 118 The additional time limitations of section 4(n)
were struck down because the substantive liability provisions
for property and personal injury damages were removed from
the statute.119 Therefore, the scheme of section 4(n) in mini-
mizing recovery for pre-enactment damages, not including re-
sponse costs, was maintained in the final version. 1
20
Accordingly, the court determined that the legislative history
of section 4(n) included retroactive effects.' 21
Next, the court in Shell Oil cited the following passage
from the Senate Report:
Removal and remedial actions to protect public health,
welfare, and the environment should begin without delay
and prior to full implementation of the programs, regula-
tions, plans, and procedures required by this Act. The
many pressing problems which have led to enactment of
legislation should not continue unabated pending such ad-
Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1077 n.5. The liability section introduced to limit
recovery for pre-enactment damages recoverable read as follows:
No person (including the United States, the Fund, or any State)
may recover under the authority of this section, nor may any money
in the Fund be used under Section 6 of this Act for the payment of
any claim, for damages specified under subsection (a)(2)(A), (B), (C),
(D), (G), or (E) (other than for loss resulting from personal injury) of
this section, nor may any money in the Fund be used under section
6(a)(1)(E) or (F) of this Act, where such damages and the release of
a hazardous substance from which such damages resulted have oc-
curred wholly before the enactment of this Act.
In addition, commenting on the provision of § 4(n) (4) that 'the
costs of temporary or permanent relocation of residences ... shall
be deemed costs of removal and not damages,' Senator Domenici
stated that the purpose of this provision was 'that those kinds of
damages become part of causes of action for costs of removal and,
therefore, are not affected by the retroactive limitations.'
Id. at 1079 (citing Transcript of Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works Mark-up Session of S. 1480, 194-95, June 26, 1980).
118. See id. See CERCLA §§ 107(f), 110(d), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(f), 9611(d)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
119. See Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1079.
120. See id.
121. See id.
21
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ministrative actions. Therefore, actions necessary to pro-
tect public health, welfare or the environment should begin
as soon as feasible. The non-regulatory authorities for re-
sponse provided in this Act and other laws should be exer-
cised prior to completion of any necessary planning,
administrative, and rulemaking responsibilities. However,
once completed, such statutorily required planning, admin-
istration and final rulemaking shall govern subsequent
government response actions.122
Shell Oil claimed that this passage indicates that actions
prior to CERCLA's enactment were not "response actions" for
which recovery can be awarded. 123 The court found that the
Senate intended government response actions to commence
as quickly as feasible because the hazardous waste problem is
immediate and severe. 124 Thus, where Congress intends a li-
ability provision to have only prospective execution, like nat-
ural resources damages, Congress uses explicit language.1 25
Here, because Congress did not explicitly restrict liability for
response costs incurred prior to enactment, the court con-
cluded that consistent with the statutory scheme, CERCLA
authorizes recovery of pre-enactment response costs.' 2
6
c. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical
& Chemical Co. (Northeastern)127
In Northeastern, the court examined the language of the
statute in concluding that CERCLA is retroactive. 28 The
court conceded that CERCLA's language does not expressly
provide for retroactivity. 129 However, the court used CER-
CLA's statutory language to support two conclusions: (1)
122. Id. (citing Transcript of Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works Mark-up Session of S. 1480, 62, June 26-27, 1980).
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See CERCLA §§ 107(f), 111(d), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(f), 9611(d) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
126. See Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1079.
127. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
128. Id. at 731.
129. See id. at 732.
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Congress intended CERCLA to have a retroactive effect; 130
and (2) the statutory scheme of CERCLA is both remedial
and retroactive. 131
Unlike Georgeoff and Shell Oil, the Northeastern court
cited specific language used in the relevant liability provision
that refers to actions and conditions in the past tense. 32 For
example, section 107 of CERCLA reads, in part, "any person
who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated,"' 33 "any person who ... arranged with a
transporter for transport for disposal," a34 and "any person
who ... accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
* . . sites selected by such person."135
Second, the court found that CERCLA has a general
scheme that is remedial and retroactive, thereby authorizing
the EPA under section 106 of CERCLA to force responsible
parties to clean up inactive hazardous waste sites.' 36 Fur-
thermore, the court concluded that CERCLA authorizes fed-
eral, state, and local governments, as well as private parties
to clean up the sites, and subsequently seek cleanup costs. 137
d. Landgraf v. USI Film Products (Landgraf)138
Recently, there has been skepticism regarding the retro-
activity of CERCLA due to the Supreme Court's decision in
Landgraf.139 The Landgraf decision significantly relates to
130. See id. at 732-33.
131. See id. at 733.
132. See id. at 732. See, e.g., Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1069-73 (D. Colo.
1985); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 220 (W.D.
Mo. 1985); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F.
Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp.
1249, 1259 (S.D. Ill. 1989); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1111-12
(D.N.J. 1983); Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1312 (N.D. Ohio 1983); United
States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54, 57 (N.D. 111. 1982); United
States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1113-14 (D. Minn. 1982).
133. CERCLA § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
134. Id. § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
135. Id. § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
136. See Northeastern, 810 F.2d at 733.
137. See id. at 733. See CERCLA §§ 104, 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9604, 9607.
138. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
139. See generally Olin, 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
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the Court's conclusion in Olin14o because the Court confirmed
the approach for determining the retroactive effect of a
statute. 14
1
Landgraf involved the 1991 Civil Rights Act 142 that cre-
ated a right to recover compensatory 143 and punitive1 4 dam-
ages for certain violations of Title VII, and provided for a jury
trial if such damages were claimed. 145 The Court held that if
a Title VII case was pending on appeal when the 1991 Civil
Rights Act was enacted, the statute did not apply. 146 As
stated in Landgraf, "when a case implicates a federal statute
enacted after the events in a suit, the Court's first task is to
determine whether Congress expressly prescribed the stat-
ute's proper reach."147
If Congress has not explicitly prescribed retroactivity,
courts must determine if the new statute is in fact retroac-
tive. 148 Under Landgraf, if the legislative intent and the lan-
guage do, not clearly indicate retroactivity, then the
presumption against it must be applied.149 The suggested
criteria included whether retroactive application would im-
pair rights of a party possessed when the action occurred, ex-
pand a party's liability for prior conduct, or compel new
duties to transactions already concluded. 150 If the statute
140. See id.
141. See, e.g., United States v. NL Indus., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 545 (S.D. Ill.
1996).
142. Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d (1964),
amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -e-17. (1991).
143. "Compensatory damages" "compensate the injured party for the injury
sustained, and nothing more; such as will simply make good or replace the loss
caused by the wrong or injury." BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990).
144. "Punitive" or "exemplary damages" are "damages on an increased scale,
awarded to the plaintiff over and above what will barely compensate him for his
property loss, where the wrong done to him was aggravated by circumstances of
violence, oppression, malice, fraud, or wanton and wicked conduct on the part of
the defendant, and are intended to solace the plaintiff. . . ." See id.
145. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1483 (1994).
146. See id.
147. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., Nos. 87-CV-920, 91-CV-1132,
1996 WL 637559, at 3 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
148. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1504.
149. Id. at 1483.
150. See id. at 1505.
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was applied retroactively, the traditional presumption was
that it did not govern absent distinct congressional intent in
favor of such a result. 151
Landgraf provided a test for determining whether retro-
activity should be applied. 152 The test is as follows:
(1) to determine (a) whether Congress has expressly stated
the statutes reach and (b) if not, whether the text and the
legislative history have clearly prescribed Congress' intent
to apply the provision retroactively; (2) if not, to determine
whether the provision actually has 'retroactive effect on
the party or parties in the litigation'; and (3) if so, to apply
the traditional presumption against retroactivity-absent
a clear congressional intent to the contrary. 153
Thus, the Landgraf decision not only relied on express retro-
activity, but the Court looked to clear congressional intent.154
The Court concluded that "requiring clear intent assures that
Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential un-
fairness of retroactive application and determined that it is
an acceptable price to pay for countervailing benefits." 155
The majority did not limit its analysis to express lan-
guage; rather, the Court included legislative history and the
statute's text to define clear congressional intent. 56 To sat-
isfy the Landgraf criteria, a successful argument must con-
sist of both textual and structural arguments because
CERCLA does not have express language. 15 7
151. See id.
152. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1511.
153. Id.
154. Landgraf 114 S. Ct. at 1500.
155. Id.
156. See Nevada ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691,
702 (D. Nev. 1996).
157. See id.
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2. Commerce Clause158
There has been some discrepancy among decisions as to
the extent of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. 159
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution em-
powers Congress to "regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States and with the Indian
Tribes ... ."160 Until 1937, the Commerce Clause had only
been interpreted to allow Congress to regulate interstate
commerce. 161 However, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. 162 (Jones & Laughlin), the Court held that "intrastate
activities [that] have such a close and substantial relation to
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appro-
priate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstruc-
tions" are within Congress' power to regulate.163
a. Wickard v. Filburn (Wickard)164
In 1937, the Court applied this new standard in Wick-
ard.165 The Court clarified the power of the Commerce
Clause and held that
the commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the
regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to
158. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824).
159. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
160. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
161. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1.
162. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
163. Id. at 37. In an attempt to assist employees, Congress enacted the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act to prevent unfair hiring practices and lockouts. See
id. at 22-23. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation refused to comply with the
Act, arguing that: (1) it is not a regulation of interstate commerce; (2) produc-
tion employees ate not regulated by the federal government; and (3) sections of
the Act violate the Constitution of the United States. See id. at 24. In rejecting
the first argument, the Supreme Court held that where a subject matter affects
commerce, it is a national matter within Congress' power to regulate. See id. at
37. Thereafter, in holding that production is the mechanism that allows a com-
modity to enter the stream of commerce, the Court upheld the Act because "it
presents in a most striking way the close and intimate relation which a manu-
facturing industry may have to interstate commerce and... Congress had [the]
constitutional authority to safeguard [employees' rights] .... " Id. at 43.
164. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
165. Id.
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those activities intrastate which so affect interstate com-
merce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as
to make regulation of them appropriate means to attain-
ment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the
granted power to regulate interstate commerce. 166
In Wickard, Congress set a quota for the amount of wheat
grown on every farm in the United States, by creating the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.167 Pursuant to the Act,
the wheat raised in excess of the quota was subject to a pen-
alty per bushel. 168 The defendant, a farmer, challenged Con-
gress' right to set a quota on wheat, which he raised for
personal consumption, on the grounds that it was a purely
local activity. 169 The Court held that Congress' power "over
interstate commerce is plenary and complete in itself, [and]
may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution."' 7 0
b. United States v. Lopez (Lopez)171
In 1995, the Supreme Court decided Lopez. 172 Here, the
Court again addressed the issue of Congress' Commerce
Clause authority.173 In Lopez, a twelfth grade student ar-
rived at high school with a concealed .38 caliber handgun and
five bullets. 174 Lopez was charged with violating the Gun-
Free School Zone Act of 1990 (Act),175 which made knowingly
possessing a firearm in a school zone a federal offense. 176 Lo-
pez claimed that Congress exceeded its power to legislate
under the Commerce Clause 177 because the Act neither regu-
166. Id. at 124 (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S.
110, 119 (1942)).
167. Id. at 115.
168. See id. at 114-15.
169. See id. at 114.
170. Id. at 123.
171. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
172. Id.
173. See id. at 1625.
174. See id. at 1626.
175. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (1990).
176. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
177. See id.
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lated a commercial activity, nor contained a requirement that
the firearm possession be connected in any way to interstate
commerce. 178
The issue in Lopez was whether Congress could regulate
gun possession under the Commerce Clause even though gun
possession is not a commercial activity, nor does it relate to
interstate commerce. 179 The Court enunciated three catego-
ries of acceptable congressional Commerce Clause regulation:
(1) use of channels of interstate commerce; (2) regulation and
protection of the instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
persons, or things in interstate commerce even though the
threat may come from intrastate activities; and (3) regulation
of those activities having a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 180
In light of this framework, the Court found that the Act
did not fit into the first two categories because there was
neither use of interstate commerce, nor an attempt to pro-
hibit an item to travel in interstate commerce.' 8 ' Therefore,
the Court analyzed the final category: whether interstate
commerce was substantially affected.'l 2
The Court determined that the Act was a criminal stat-
ute and, thus, did not relate to commerce or economic enter-
prise.18 3 Therefore, the Court reasoned that "it [the Act]
cannot be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of
activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial
transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially af-
fects interstate commerce. 18 4
Next, the Court found that the statute did not contain a
jurisdictional element showing that firearm possession af-
fected commerce.' 8 5 Although the jurisdictional element is
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 1629.
181. See id. at 1630.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 1630-31.
184. Id.
185. See id. See also United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (holding
that the possession component of the statute in question required an additional
nexus to interstate commerce).
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not a part of the test enunciated in Lopez, the Court found it
persuasive in relation to this criminal Act.18 6 Ultimately, the
Court determined that the possession of a gun in a school
zone was not an economic activity.'8 7 Furthermore, even if
this activity occurred elsewhere, it still would not have any
concrete relation to interstate commerce.' 88  Therefore, the
Gun-Free School Zone Act was declared unconstitutional be-
cause it exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause authority. 8 9
III. United States v. Olin Corp. (Olin)19o
In light of the recent Supreme Court decisions in Lan-
dgraf and Lopez, the Olin court evaluated whether CERCLA
should still be upheld.191
A. Facts and Procedural History
The United States filed a complaint under CERCLA
against Olin Corp., a Virginia corporation operating a chemi-
cal plant. 92 Along with the complaint, the parties filed a con-
sent decree.' 93 The government sought to recover cleanup
costs due to mercury 94 and chloroform 95 (hazardous sub-
stances)196 that were allegedly released. 97
186. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. The Government conceded that neither
the statute nor the legislative histories contain any evidence regarding the stat-
ute's affect on interstate commerce. See id.
187. See id. at 1634.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
191. Id.
192. See id. at 1503.
193. See id. A consent decree is "a judgment entered by consent of the par-
ties whereby the defendant agrees to stop alleged illegal activity without admit-
ting guilt or wrongdoing .... Upon approval of such agreement by the court the
government's action against the defendant is dropped." BLAcK's LAw DICTION-
ARY 410-11 (6th ed. 1990).
194. Mercury is listed as a hazardous waste in 40 C.F.R. § 261.33 (1996). See
id.
195. Chloroform is listed as a hazardous waste in 40 C.F.R § 261, App. VIII.
(1996). See id.
196. See supra note 11.
197. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1504.
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The government alleged that there were two actionable
sites at the Olin property; however, this action only involved
Site 1.198 The government asserted that from 1952-1974, Site
1 was used as a mercury-cell chloralkali plant, which re-
leased water containing mercury into Site 2.199 Then, in
1955, the plant operated a crop-protection-chemicals plant
that was responsible for discharging wastewater into Site 2
until 1974.200 Due to the plant's operations, mercury and
chloroform were allegedly released into Site 1.201 Both plants
ceased operating in 1982.202 Thereafter, in 1984 the EPA
placed the Olin Site on the NPL.20 3
Both parties signed the proposed consent decree and
jointly moved for the court to enter the decree. 20 4 Although,
Olin was willing to enter into the decree, the court asserted
that it had a duty to "not only to determine whether its fac-
tual and legal determinations are reasonable, but also to en-
sure that the decree does not violate the Constitution, a
federal statute or the controlling jurisprudence."20 5 Accord-
ingly, the court required the parties to file briefs discussing
whether CERCLA, as applied to this case, followed the
Supreme Court's decision in Lopez regarding the Commerce
Clause.20 6 After the court directed the parties to file briefs on
the Commerce Clause issue, the defendant then raised the
issue of CERCLA's retroactivity, claiming that "Congress did
not intend for CERCLA to be retroactive and that if it did,
CERCLA violates the Due Process Clause and unconstitu-
tionally delegates legislative power to the EPA."20 7
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. Id. at 1506-07.
206. See id. at 1507.
207. See id.
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B. Reasoning and Holding
According to precedent, a court should dispose of a case
on non-constitutional grounds before deciding a constitu-
tional issue whenever possible. 208 Therefore, the court re-
viewed the statutory question of whether Congress intended
CERCLA to apply retroactively before considering constitu-
tional issues. 209 The precedent regarding the proper test to
be applied in determining if a retroactive application of a
statute is permissible is contradictory. 210 The Olin court
agreed that in the past a retroactive application of CERCLA
was permissible. 211 However, in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Landgraf, which addressed and resolved the dis-
crepancy of retroactive application, 21 2 the court held that
CERCLA must no longer be applied in this manner.21 3
First, the Olin court explained that Landgraf "demol-
ishes the interpretive premise on which prior cases had con-
cluded CERCLA is retroactive."214 The Landgraf decision
was viewed as reaffirming "the traditional presumption
against retroactiv[ity] ."215 Thus, the court dismissed the ear-
lier influential case Georgeoff, asserting that Georgeoff did ex-
actly what Landgraf rejected.216 That is, the court explained
208. See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936).
209. See, e.g., Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1507 (citing Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347).
The Eleventh Circuit has never squarely addressed whether CERCLA is retro-
active, but in Virginia Properties Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 74 F.3d 1131 (11th Cir.
1996), in dicta, the court suggested that CERCLA was retroactive. See id. at
1132. However, in Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Sarland Apartments, Ltd., 875 F.
Supp 1545 (11th Cir. 1995), although the parties did not argue the issue of ret-
roactivity, the court did not apply certain regulations retroactively. See id. at
1564.
210. See Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969); Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988); Bradley v. School Bd. of Rich-
mond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1
(1976).
211. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1507.
212. See id. at 1508.
213. See id. at 1519.
214. Id. at 1508.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 1509.
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that Georgeoff seemed to apply a presumption in favor of
retroactivity. 2 17
The court also asserted that two other cases, Shell and
Northeastern, enunciated their own analyses and gave "little
regard for the presumption" against retroactivity. 218 The
court concluded that Landgraf clarifies the analysis of retro-
activity and impacts Olin significantly; thus, the govern-
ment's argument that Landgraf is unremarkable was found
to be credible.21 9
The Olin court considered the test enunciated in Lan-
dgraf.220 In Landgraf, the Supreme Court held that if a stat-
ute does not explicitly state that it should be applied
retroactively, the court must determine if the statute should
be retroactive with non-express text and legislative his-
tory.221 Here, the Olin court found that there was no express
language in the statute;222 therefore, a presumption against
retroactivity was applied. 223
Next, to determine if this presumption could be lifted,
the court looked at non-express statutory language, focusing
on sections 106(a)224 and 107(a).225 The court found that
under Landgraf, the government's argument that section 106
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 1508.
220. Id. at 1512.
221. See id. at 1511.
222. Id. at 1512.
223. See id. at 1516.
224. CERCLA provides:
In addition to any other action taken by a State or local govern-
ment, when the President determines that there may be an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare
or the environment because of an actual or threatened release of a
hazardous substance from a facility, he may require the Attorney
General of the United States to secure such relief as may be neces-
sary to abate such danger or threat, and the district in which the
threat occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the pub-
lic interest and the equities of the case may require. The President
may also, after notice to the affected State take other action under
this section including, but not limited to, issuing such orders as
may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the
environment.
CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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contains language that demonstrates congressional intent to
authorize retroactivity fails.226 The government's brief relied
on Northeastern's finding that "the language used in the key
liability provision, CERCLA § 107 . . .refers to actions and
conditions in past tense."227 The Olin court, however, high-
lighted the Georgeoff analysis that explained that the use of
past tense was not dispositive. 228
Then, the court analyzed the legislative history of CER-
CLA.229 The court refused to follow prior holdings from other
jurisdictions rejecting the body of case law promoted by the
government regarding retroactivity. 230 The court empha-
sized the fact that the prior decisions were not considered in
light of Landgraf.231 Moreover, the court suggested that the
failure of Congress not to expressly include retroactive effect
was deliberate. 232 Additionally, the court addressed the limit
on retroactive recovery of response costs whether incurred
before or after CERCLA's enactment. 233
Second, the court attempted to distinguish between the
effect of the statute and the intent of Congress. 234 In compar-
ing the compensatory damages analysis of the Landgraf opin-
ion with the financial liabilities of CERCLA, the court
claimed that "the new damages remedy in Section 102. . . is
the kind of provision that does not apply to events antedating
225. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. See generally CERCLA
§ 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
226. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1513. This may be due to the fact that the
right arguments were not made. The Olin court noted: "The Justice Depart-
ment devotes little attention to statutory language as evidence of congressional
intent." Id.
227. Id. (citing Northeastern, 810 F.2d 726, 773 (8th Cir. 1986)).
228. However, the Georgeoff court did not assert that the language was not
evidence of congressional intent, it merely claimed that the statutory argument
was not enough to overcome the presumption [against] retroactivity. Id. at
1513.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 1514.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See Nevada ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691,
702 (D. Nev. 1996).
234. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1516.
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its enactment in the absence of clear congressional intent."235
Third, the court determined that the presumption against
retroactivity should apply.236 In interpreting Landgraf, this
court determined that "a provision for punitive damages
should not be construed as retroactive unless the language
forces that conclusion because the court must then confront
substantial constitutional questions which follow." 237
The Olin court concluded that CERCLA contains no ex-
plicit language of retroactivity and no language that clearly
indicates a congressional intent of retroactivity that is re-
quired by Landgraf.23s The court rejected the government's
attempt to argue that the key provisions of CERCLA contain
language that refers to the past tense.239 Next, the court
looked to legislative history of CERCLA and determined that
the issue of retroactivity was not precisely addressed.240 The
court concluded that
[n]othing presented in the Justice Department['s] brief or
pre-Landgraf cases concerning the statutory language of
CERCLA or its legislative history demonstrated that Sec-
tion 107(a) (and/or Section 106(a) as related to it in this
case) is 'the sort of provision that must be understood to
operate retroactively because a contrary reading would
render it ineffective.'24 1
Next, the court addressed the constitutionality of the
statute in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Lopez.242 In Lopez, the Court held that "the federal
gun statute at issue attempted to exercise police power over
matters historically falling within the jurisdiction of local
government."243 The Olin court claimed that Lopez requires:
"(1) that the statute itself regulate economic activity, which
235. Id. (citing Lopez, 114 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)).
236. See id. at 1518 (citing Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1507-08 (1994)).
237. Id. at 1517.
238. See id. at 1513.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 1514.
241. Id. at 1519 (citing Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1507-08) (emphasis added).
242. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
243. Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1522.
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activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce, and (2)
that the statute include a 'jurisdictional element which would
ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the [statute] in
question affects interstate commerce.'" 244
In applying Lopez to the present case, the Olin court sim-
ilarly believed that the object of regulation was not economic
activity or commerce 245 because the plants at issue had not
been in operation since 1982.246 The court held that an activ-
ity must not only have a substantial affect on interstate com-
merce, but must also be an economic activity; thus, the
"application of CERCLA to this case exceeds the power given
to Congress under the Commerce Clause."247 Moreover, the
court claimed that: (1) CERCLA regulates in the area of na-
tional police power, which Lopez forbids;248 and (2) the stat-
ute does not allow for a case-by-case inquiry.249 Ultimately,
the court determined that like the Gun-Free School Zone Act
in Lopez, CERCLA exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause
authority.250
IV. Analysis
First, CERCLA clearly passes the Landgraf test 251 for
three reasons: (1) language; (2) structure; and (3) legislative
history. Although there is no express retroactive language in
CERCLA, it is clear that CERCLA was intended by Congress
to be retroactive.252 Second, CERCLA is not an abuse of Con-
244. Id. at 1532.
245. Id.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 1523.
248. See id. at 1533.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. In Landgraf, a test was developed that solved the retroactivity quan-
dary. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1505. First, the Court examines any statutory
language that specifically describes the statute's reach. See id. If none can be
found, the Court must decipher whether applying the statute would result in a
retroactive effect. See id. If so, the Court applies a presumption against Con-
gress intending such a result. See id. Lastly, the Court examines the statutory
construction and legislative history to ascertain whether Congress clearly in-
tended a retroactive effect. See id.
252. See, e.g., supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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gress' Commerce Clause authority.253 CERCLA passes the
Lopez "substantial affects" test, and is not in any way analo-
gous to the Gun-Free School Zone Act in Lopez.
A. Retroactivity
Although the Supreme Court recently addressed the is-
sue of retroactivity in Landgraf,25 4 the Court has not ad-
dressed this issue in the context of CERCLA.255 Prior to
Landgraf, there was a discrepancy among Supreme Court de-
cisions concerning the proper test to determine when a stat-
ute could be applied retroactively. 25 6 In Landgraf, the Court
recognized this problem and explained that the Court has
uniformly held that a presumption against retroactivity
should apply.257 Thus, if there is no express language, clear
congressional intent governs. 258
In applying the Landgraf retroactivity test, the Olin
court asserted that the pre-Olin decisions holding CERCLA
retroactive were obsolete because these opinions did not ap-
ply the requirements for retroactivity established in Lan-
dgraf.259 However, no court has agreed with the Olin
decision. 260 Consequently, the Olin court's interpretation of
Landgraf created an anomaly in the law regarding CER-
CLA's application.
Prior to Olin, federal courts applied a presumption
against retroactivity, and then rebutted that presumption
with an examination of statutory language and legislative
history to determine if there was a clear congressional intent
to apply CERCLA retroactively.261 The Olin court attempted
to illustrate how past retroactive arguments now fail under
253. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., Nos. 87-CV-920, 91-
CV-1132, 1996 WL 937559 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. NL Indus., Inc.,
936 F. Supp. 545 (S.D. Ill. 1996).
254. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1507.
255. See id. at 1507.
256. See supra Part II.B.1.
257. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1496.
258. See id.
259. Id.
260. See supra notes 7, 25 and accompanying text.
261. See Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1302 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
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Olin by using three leading cases: Georgeoff,262 Shell Oil,263
and Northeastern.264 Although these cases hold that CER-
CIA is retroactive, the analysis to achieve retroactivity var-
ies because the courts focused on different elements of the
statute and legislative history to rebut the presumption of
retroactivity.
Since the Landgraf decision, the only court in the Nation
to conclude that the retroactivity test has changed is the Olin
court. As an initial matter, Landgraf did not set forth a new
rule of law regarding retroactive application of a statute.
Rather, it clarified the traditional presumption against retro-
activity. Thus, the substantive examination in the pre-Olin
cases is analogous to the Landgraf test. Therefore, the Olin
court improperly dismissed Georgeoff and its progeny.
Although there is no express language to verify CER-
CLA's retroactivity, it is evident from the language, struc-
ture, and legislative history that Congress intended CERCLA
to operate retroactively. Retroactivity is consistent with the
purpose of CERCLA, which is "t[o] provide for liability, com-
pensation, cleanup, and emergency response for hazardous
substances released into the environment and the cleanup of
inactive hazardous waste disposal sites."265 CERCLA was
created to clean up hazardous waste sites and allocate finan-
cial responsibility to achieve these goals.266 Congress in-
tended liability to attach to improper disposal actions
occurring before the enactment date of 1980.267
CERCLA itself provides numerous examples of clear evi-
dence of congressional intent. CERCLA's civil liability provi-
262. Id. at 1300.
263. 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985).
264. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986). In Northeastern, the court concedes that
CERCLA does not expressly provide for retroactivity, however, the court uses
the statutory language argument in two ways: (1) "it is manifestly clear that
Congress intended CERCLA to have retroactive effect"; and (2) "the statutory
scheme itself is overwhelmingly remedial and retroactive." Id. at 732-33.
265. Pub. L. No. 96-510, at 1, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980).
266. See S. REP. No. 96-848 (1980), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 13.
267. See, e.g., Cooper Indus. v. Agway, Inc., No. 92-CV-0748, 1996 WL
550128 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that the language, structure, purpose and leg-
islative history establish clear congressional intent).
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sion, section 107,268 sets out three distinct forms of liability:
(1) "all costs of removal or remedial action";269 (2) "any other
necessary costs of response";270 and (3) natural resource dam-
ages. 271 In contrast, CERCLA provides two natural resource
damages provisions:272 (1) section 107(f)(1) provides that
"there shall be no recovery . . . [where] such damages re-
sulted have occurred wholly before December 11, 1980"; 273
and (2) section 111(d)(1) provides that "[n]o money in the
Fund may be used ... where the injury, destruction, or loss
of natural resources and the release of a hazardous substance
from which such damages resulted have occurred wholly
before December 11, 1980."2 74 Thus, CERCLA specifically
limits natural resources damages to a prospective applica-
tion, but fails to limit response costs in the same manner.
This provides evidence that Congress intended a retroactive
application of response costs.
Furthermore, the above mentioned liability provision is
in past tense. Section 107 contains language such as: (1)
"owned or operated any facility" at the time of hazardous
waste disposal;275 (2) "arranged for disposal or treatment" of
hazardous waste;276 and (3) "accepted" hazardous waste for
transport.277 Thus, this language is further evidence of Con-
gress' intent for a retroactive application of CERCLA.278
268. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
269. Id. § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
270. Id. § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
271. Id. § 107(a)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
272. See Nevada ex rel. Dep't. of Transp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691,
701 (D. Nev. 1996).
273. CERCLA § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).
274. Id. § 111(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(d) (1).
275. Id. § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
276. Id. § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
277. Id. § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
278. The Olin court completely discarded the negative implication argument
because the Court in Landgraf addressed a similar negative inference argu-
ment and it was rejected. However, Landgraf is distinguishable because the
provisions emphasized were merely a minor part of the statute. See Nevada ex
rel. Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691 (D. Nev. 1996). Addi-
tionally, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and CERCLA are starkly different. The
statutory construction and the historical background are especially important
due to the political circumstances surrounding the enactment of CERCLA. See
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Additionally, section 103(c) provides that "[wlithin one
hundred and eighty days after December 11, 1980, any per-
son who owns or operates or who at the time of disposal
owned or operated... [a facility must] ... notify the Adminis-
trator of the Environmental Protection Agency of the exist-
ence of such facility... "279 It is reasonable to infer from this
language that Congress intended for CERCLA's retroactive
application. As shown, there are no time limitations in CER-
CLA's language restricting CERCLA to a prospective applica-
tion, except in the above mentioned natural resources
liability section.
Moreover, the general scheme of environmental statutes
implicates retroactive effect due to the void CERCLA was en-
acted to fill.280 RCRA operates prospectively, to prohibit en-
vironmental catastrophes such as Love Canal.28 1 Congress
specifically intended to create a mechanism to address the en-
vironmental degradation that occurred in the past.28 2 In
light of the background in which CERCLA was created, to in-
terpret CERCLA in a prospective manner would clearly be
ineffective.
B. The Constitutionality of CERCLA
The Commerce Clause is fully applicable to CERCLA.28 3
However, the Olin court ruled that "CERCLA cannot be ap-
plied to regulate intrastate groundwater contamination
under the Commerce Clause."28 4 The court's main constitu-
id. (citing J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.03 (5th
ed. 1992)).
279. CERCLA § 103(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c).
280. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, at 22, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 2, at Vol. II, 53. See also Nevada, 925 F. Supp. at 702; United States
v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785, 792-93 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (finding that CERCLA was
"designed to plug in the gaps" in existing anti-pollution laws) (citing Nevada,
925 F. Supp. 691).
281. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
283. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 282 (1981) (holding that the Commerce Clause is broad enough to permit
congressional findings demonstrating the effects of unregulated surface mining
on interstate commerce). See Brief, supra note 8, at 17.
284. Brief, supra note 8, at 17-18.
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tional argument relies on the Supreme Court's decision in
Lopez.285
The Lopez Court narrowly read Congress' . Commerce
Clause authority.28 6 This narrow reading is limited in focus
and does not reach CERCLA. The Lopez Court premised its
argument on the three factors 28 7 that it enumerated regard-
ing the regulatory power of Congress. First, it must be
remembered that the Act in Lopez was a criminal gun control
statute. 288 The Lopez Court found that the Act was "a crimi-
nal statute that by its terms has nothing to with commerce
.... ",289 CERCLA does not include any mention of commerce
in its text or legislative history.290 Unlike the Act at issue in
Lopez, CERCLA is a comprehensive mechanism for respond-
ing to releases of hazardous waste and for assessing liability
against those responsible for the pollution.291 Additionally,
CERCLA sets standards and creates schedules for cleanups,
and deters improper disposals through its liability provi-
sions.292 Moreover, the activities that CERCLA affects have
an impact on the economy (i.e. fishing industry, agriculture,
domestic and industrial water supplies, livestock protection
and recreation). 293
Second, the issue in Olin was that groundwater was re-
leased which contained mercury, thereby contaminating
other sites.294 The Supreme Court has concluded that
285. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1624, 1630 (1995).
286. Interview with Bennett Gershman, Professor of Law at Pace University
School of Law (Nov. 1, 1996).
287. Lopez articulates the principles necessary for Congress to regulate com-
merce: (1) "the use of channels of interstate commerce"; (2) when regulating and
protecting the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities; (3) authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a
substantial relationship to interstate commerce. Brief, supra note 12, at 18 (cit-
ing Lopez, 155 S. Ct. at 1629-30).
288. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1624.
289. Id.
290. See Brief, supra note 11, at 17-18.
291. See id. at 18.
292. United States v. NL Indus., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 545, 562 (S.D. Ill. 1996).
293. See id.
294. Olin, 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1504 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
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groundwater is an article of interstate commerce. 295 There-
fore, groundwater is subject to congressional regulation.296
As shown, the Gun-Free School Zone Act in Lopez is com-
pletely different than CERCLA; thus, it is unreasonable to
apply the analysis of Lopez to Olin.
Additionally, the Olin court claimed that the activities
being regulated must be economic;297 however, the Lopez
Court did not indicate that the activities need be purely eco-
nomic.298 The Supreme Court has held that solid or liquid
waste is an item of commerce, which is clearly economic ac-
tivity.299 Thus, the wastewater from the Olin Site, which con-
tained hazardous waste, is an item of commerce.
Third, the Lopez argument does not apply because, un-
like CERCLA, that Act did not have a "widespread" affect on
economic activity. Clearly, CERCLA falls within this crite-
rion because, as in Wickard, the activity in Olin had a sub-
stantial affect on interstate commerce. The Olin court
ignored that "the Supreme Court consistently looks to the
'class of activities' regulated by the legislation in the aggre-
gate, rather than the individual activities in the particular
case."
30 0
Finally, the Olin court held that CERCLA fails the juris-
dictional requirement of the Lopez test.30 However, Lopez
does not require that every statute pass the jurisdictional ele-
ment in order to pass constitutional muster.30 2 Moreover,
unlike the Act in Lopez, CERCLA is a civil statute, which
clearly does not impose criminal liability.30 3 Pursuant to the
Lopez test, it is enough that a statute pass the "substantially
295. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 485 U.S. 941 (1982).
296. See id.
297. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1531.
298. See id. at 1532-33.
299. See City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
300. Brief, supra note 8, at 20-21.
301. See supra Part II.B.2.b. See also Brief, supra note 8, at 19-20.
302. See Brief, supra note 8, at 19-20.
303. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
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affects" element.30 4 Therefore, if the Lopez test is applied
properly, CERCLA would be deemed constitutional. Thus,
the Olin court misinterpreted the Lopez decision and analy-
sis. Accordingly, the district court's opinion was reversed in
March of this year.
V. The Appeal
On March 25, 1997, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit overturned the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Alabama in United
States v. Olin Corp. (Olin II).305 The court reviewed de novo
whether applying CERCLA to onsite contamination was in
violation of the Congress' Commerce Clause authority and
whether CERCLA can be applied retroactively.30 6 To review,
the district court dismissed the government's complaint
against Olin holding that the Constitution prohibits enforce-
ment of CERCLA against a party whose conduct was limited
to its own property. 30 7 Additionally, the court held that CER-
CLA's liability cleanup provisions apply only prospectively.308
On appeal, Olin again characterized the CERCLA en-
forcement action as being beyond the reach of Congress' Com-
merce Clause authority.30 9 Olin asserted that CERCLA
enforcement was not justified because there was no evidence
that its onsite disposal activities affected interstate com-
merce. 310 Additionally, Olin argued that its disposal activi-
ties were not economic in nature and, therefore, escaped
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.311 Ac-
cordingly, Olin asserted that the district court's decision
should be upheld.312
304. See id. See also Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1995)
(holding that legislation regulates activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce and is therefore within Congress' constitutional power).
305. United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997).
306. See id. at 1509.
307. See id. at 1508.
308. See id.
309. See id. at 1511.
310. See id.
311. See id.
312. See id.
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Next, Olin argued that the district court's ruling on ret-
roactivity should be affirmed.3 13 Olin asserted that under
Landgraf, no statute can be applied in a retroactive manner
without a showing of clear intent by Congress. 314 Olin ar-
gued that CERCLA does not contain explicit language that
provides for retroactive liability for cleanup liability provi-
sions.315 To the contrary, Olin stated that Congress intended
to impose liability merely on "future former owners and oper-
ators"; that is, those parties that would become "former" after
December 11, 1980.316 Olin conceded that CERCLA applied
to sites contaminated prior to this date; however, costs in-
curred for the cleanup of such sites would be borne by indus-
try and private taxpayers.317 Furthermore, Olin argued that
CERCLA's legislative history concerning retroactivity should
be disregarded because a compromise bill was passed.318 For
these reasons, Olin maintained that the district court's hold-
ing in regard to retroactivity should be affirmed.
The government argued that the Commerce Clause can
be used to regulate hazardous waste site cleanups regardless
of whether hazardous substance migration has occurred. 319
The government stated, "Congress' determination that con-
tamination from hazardous waste sites as a class substan-
tially affects interstate commerce allows regulation of any
activity that falls within that class without further proof of
an effect on commerce."320
Additionally, the government contended that Congress
expressed the intent to apply response costs retroactively.321
The government asserted that the express limitation on the
recovery of natural resources would have no purpose unless
Congress intended that a similar limitation would not apply
313. See id. at 1512.
314. See id.
315. See id.
316. See id. at 1513.
317. See id. at 1514.
318. See id. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
319. See Olin 11, 107 F.3d at 1510.
320. 11th Cir. Finds CERCLA Retroactive, Constitutional, 10 MEALEY'S Li-
TIG. REP.: SUPERFUND 3, Apr. 14, 1997.
321. See Olin 11, 107 F.3d at 1512.
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to the recovery of response costs.322 Furthermore, the gov-
ernment argued that the instant dispute was distinguishable
from Landgraf because the retroactive sections of the Civil
Rights Act were "comparatively minor and narrow provisions
in a long and complex statute."323 In comparison, the govern-
ment argued that the liability provisions of CERCLA are
clearly of "central importance to the statute."324
The court found that hazardous waste disposal is the
type of activity that substantially affects interstate com-
merce. 325 Accordingly, the court held that "although Con-
gress did not include in CERCLA either legislative findings or
a jurisdictional element, the statute remains valid as applied
in this case because it regulates a class of activities that sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce." 326 Furthermore, the
court rejected Olin's claim regarding a lack of harm to inter-
state commerce. 327 The court concluded that the regulation
of onsite waste disposal is consistent with Congress' objective
to protect interstate commerce from pollution.328
Secondly, the court held that the language329 and legisla-
tive history of CERCLA33° "confirms that Congress intended
to impose retroactive liability for cleanup."33' The court
found that Congress "targeted both current and former own-
ers and operators of contaminated sites" as a result of specific
language in the statute.332 Additionally, the court found that
legislative history indicates that CERCLA was intended to be
applied retroactively.333 The court concluded that although a
. 322. See id. (referring to CERCLA § 111(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(d)(1) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
323. See Olin H, 107 F.3d at 1512.
324. Id.
325. See id. at 1510.
326. Id.
327. See id. at 1511.
328. See id.
329. See id. at 1513.
330. See id. at 1514.
331. See id.
332. Id.
333. See id.
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compromise bill existed, the compromise did not relate to the
retroactive cleanup of contaminated sites.334
VI. Conclusion
No court since Olin has followed the Olin court's analysis
or findings. As shown on appeal,335 the Olin court incorrectly
held that according to the decisions in Landgraf and Lopez,
CERCLA is not retroactive nor unconstitutional. The Olin
court misconstrued both Supreme Court holdings. First,
Congress did not exceed its power under the Commerce
Clause because CERCLA regulates economic activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce. Second, CER-
CLA's text, structure, and legislative history reveal a clear
legislative intent to apply the response costs liability section
retroactively.
The Olin decision was a major departure from existing
case law. As a result, the Olin decision had the potential to
allow those who jeopardize the lives of humans and the envi-
ronment to reap the benefits of their conduct without contrib-
uting to rectifying the affliction. Parties that have polluted
should not be able to benefit from their wrongdoing merely
because at the time there was no statute forbidding their hei-
nous acts.
334. See id.
335. See generally id.
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